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In September 2014 four civilians working for the UK-owned Group 4 Security (G4S) 
received the Queen’s Gallantry Medal for their actions during an attack on the British 
Council compound in Kabul in 2011. The four men, all former soldiers who had served in 
the British Brigade of Gurkhas, were the first private security operatives to receive such 
an award, making this a significant step in the convergence of, and overlap between, the 
two sectors: private military and security companies (PMSCs) and the national armed 
forces. As veterans with over 50 collective years of army experience, they typify a well-
established pattern whereby military-trained personnel transfer into the private sector. 
But there are other reasons why these hardened ex-soldiers provide a fitting introduction 
to this chapter on the dynamics of race and ethnicity in the private security sphere.  
In this instance, the men were working for G4S Gurkha Security Services. Born in 
Nepal, their elite background as former Gurkhas had supplied them with a unique ethnic 
identification which they were able to exploit in order to sell their services as particular 
kinds of warriors. This marketable attribute derived from British imperial history 
simultaneously positioned them as distinctly ‘foreign’, regardless of whether they had 
been naturalised as UK citizens in the meantime. As both migrants and minorities, 
however, their status within the private security sphere would automatically entail a 
degree of vulnerability and ‘outsiderness’. The combination of all these factors underline 
the urgency of understanding why migration has become such a central feature of private 
security work. 
  
The Military Migrant 
Military migrants are an integral feature of the contemporary military and security 
industry whether they are actively taking part in armed conflict or carrying out routine 
work involved in servicing military bases. A recent report by Al-Jazeera noted that the 
US military’s Central Command currently employ nearly 40,000 foreign contract workers 
to do jobs such as cooking, housekeeping and driving in US bases in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and elsewhere. While these men and women are recruited to perform low paid menial 
labour, their role has become indispensable to the operation of US military power, almost 
anywhere in the world including Guantanamo. If we include this example of service work 
alongside the ex-Gurkha security personnel employed by G4S, we can immediately see 
how hard it is to offer a concise definition of the broad category of military migration. 
However, within the past decade, certain strands of military-related migration have begun 
to attract attention from scholars who have adopted distinct but overlapping perspectives 
towards the study of migrant labour within the private security sector. As a result, the 
deep-rooted racial, ethnic and cultural hierarchies within this “global market for force”, 
(Chisholm in this Handbook), are gradually coming into view. We begin with an 
overview of this literature and its significance in understanding the wider phenomenon of 
military migration. 
 The most recent body of work considers the military migrant worker as a distinct 
category of person subject to governmental power without effective legal protection (Li 
2015, Gammeltoft-Hansen in this Handbook). A focus on the legal aspects of military 
migration is essential in understanding the scale of what Li terms the “offshoring” of 
military power. It is widely known, he writes, that the US military has been radically 
  
“transformed over the past fifteen years by widespread outsourcing to private contractors, 
whose numbers rival or even exceed those of uniformed personnel in war zones” (Li 
2015: 127) 
What is less well known, however, is that the most of the overseas contractor 
workforce are not American citizens, but men and women known as third country 
nationals (TCNs). Li explains why their predicament ought to attract greater attention 
from policy analysts and academic researchers:  
“TCNs in particular work on U.S. bases under military authority while lacking 
most of the protections of American law, local regimes, or their home 
governments. They are often employed by non-U.S. companies subcontracted by 
American corporations, paid a fraction of what American contractors and soldiers 
make, and can be easily deported if deemed noncompliant. Many are forced to 
pay recruiting firms exorbitant fees to secure their jobs, leaving them highly 
indebted and effectively indentured” (Li 2015: 127). 
While his analysis throws light on the hardships faced by military migrants within the US 
military complex, there are also broader questions to be asked about the rapid increase in 
privately contracted workers within a global context, whether they are trained to use 
lethal skills or part of the workforce maintaining military bases. Although they 
undoubtedly face the same problems as many other economic migrants, military migrants 
occupy a different status because, as Li reminds us, they are employed “on behalf of a 
foreign government in the exercise of a core sovereign function: namely, the use of 
force” (Li 2015: 127). As a result, they are frequently left in limbo in terms of 
employment rights, immigration regulations and access to any form of legal protection  
  
The second area of analysis considers what Paul Higate describes as ‘the gendered 
and racialised contexts’ of an industry made up of an increasingly ‘diverse security 
contracting workforce’ (Higate 2012:37). Military migrants frequently endure the 
discriminatory terms and conditions that come with the status of being a TCN. Maya 
Eichler emphasizes the fact that, while there is scant data on the gender breakdown of the 
military migrant workforce, the vast majority of TCNs are men who come from the 
global South, from countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Philippines, 
El Salvador, Chile, or Uganda (2013). However, she adds, “the category of TCN 
technically includes workers from Western countries other than the USA, such as the UK, 
Australia, or Canada and from countries in Eastern European and the former Soviet 
Union” (8). This is an important point because the privatization of military work draws 
largely on the experience and skills provided by thousands of former soldiers eager to 
transfer into a more risky but lucrative job market. Yet within this market, already 
stratified by nationality, ethnicity, geography and reputation based on fitness for martial 
labour, TCNs and local nationals (LNs) are motivated ‘to strike an ethnic bargain trading 
on assumptions around their embodied identities in return for material reward’ (Higate 
2012).  As we shall see below, the example of the former Gurkha soldiers, employed by 
G4S as an elite force, exemplifies this pattern.  
A third dimension of the military migration phenomenon concerns the complex 
question of militarized citizenship and the extent to which this concept remains a key 
feature of postcolonial societies, especially where the legacies of imperialist history are 
still pending. Exploring the use of migrant labour in military and security work can help 
to illuminate the changing status of soldiering as an occupation that is intrinsically 
  
connected to national citizenship. As the trend towards the privatization of security and 
military work continues, national military institutions become less accountable to public 
scrutiny, less representative of national populations and increasingly detached from 
conventional notions of patriotism and duty.  
Drawing on the valuable scholarship carried out in the areas sketched out above, 
this chapter will suggest that the use of a racialized migrant labour force to supplement 
and supplant the work of state armed forces can illuminate “the politics of market 
fundamentalism, militarism and disposability” (Giroux 2014) that drive modern forms of 
warfare. In short, the field of military migration is distorted externally by range of 
factors: postcolonial dynamics; geopolitical arrangements; labour trafficking; 
immigration controls; and deep structures of global economic inequality. Internally, the 
study of military migrants must also reckon with the vulnerabilities and dangers inherent 
in war-related work; the discrepancies between the roles and rewards entailed in being 
soldiers, mercenaries or unskilled service workers; the racism of military personnel which 
is often intensified by overseas deployment; and the changing relationship between 
armed security work and access to citizenship and residency rights. All these factors 
contribute to the market in privatized military and security work, affecting both buyers 
and sellers of migrant labour in a world in which the lines between state armed forces and 
private security and military companies are increasingly blurred. In the next section, we 
address this convergence by examining the recent use of postcolonial migrant labour in 
the UK military.  
 
Military migrants in the state sector 
  
In his study of the topic, Corporate Warriors (2008), Peter Singer attributes the rapid 
growth of the global security industry to the break-up of the state monopoly of the 
military profession, a process that began to manifest itself in the 1990s. This point 
foregrounds the traffic of demobilized soldiers, fresh from deployment in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, into this emerging industry and provides one explanation for the blurring of 
lines between state and corporate interests. However, Eichler disagrees that the 
inexorable expansion of the private sector signals the weakening of the state’s monopoly 
over legitimate force. Rather, she asserts, PMSCs have “joined Western states as key 
actors in global conflict”(2013:1). Focusing on the example of the US, she argues there 
are two reasons why the two sectors are locked in a more complex symbiosis:  
“First… the neoliberal remaking of militarized citizenship through the termination 
of male conscription in 1973 was instrumental in paving the way for the increased 
privatization of military security, and second … the outsourcing of military work to 
private companies allows for a global rescaling of recruitment that has geographically 
extended the spatial and social determinants of who works for or in support of the US 
military” (2013:1). 
With regards to her first point, the abolition of conscription within the US and 
North American context can be usefully compared to the situation in European national 
states where the practice of compulsory national service for men has been pivotal in 
defining the relationship between citizenship, military service, and masculinity since the 
late 18
th
 century. Norway and Austria are in a small minority of states that have opted to 
retain or even extend conscription as the majority of Europe has moved to the principle of 
all-volunteer professional armies, particularly post 1989. Despite these notable 
  
exceptions, the end of national conscription signals a radical shift towards rebranding 
military service as a profession that stresses individual choice, lifestyle and career 
enhancement. Consequently recruiting officers have to compete within a crowded 
employment market and therefore find it increasingly hard to attract the requisite 
numbers and quality of applicants even after reducing the size of the regular standing 
armies.  
Since the UK abolished national service in 1960, the armed forces have 
experienced many peaks and troughs in terms of voluntary enlistment. On several 
occasions during the late 20
th
 century, the paucity (and quality) of volunteers provoked 
vigorous debates in parliament about how to supplement the ranks with migrant labour 
from former colonies. As the history of post-war Britain indicates, this unresolved 
imperial heritage means that successive governments have been able to draw on a vast 
reserve of labour to supplement the indigenous workforce, not just in the military but 
across the public sector. It is impossible to imagine the development of Britain’s National 
Health Service, for example, without factoring in the historic contribution of migrant 
workers from the New Commonwealth and former colonies. But soldiers perform a 
different role from nurses, doctors and transport workers as their profession involves 
training in the use of lethal force. The deliberations about recruiting men (and 
occasionally women) from Commonwealth countries frequently alluded to the racial 
characteristics, reliability and martial qualities of the particular ethnicities concerned, 
always with an eye to the potential problems involved in compromising the national 
character of the armed forces.  
  
A brief detour into the phenomenon of Britain’s 21st century ‘Foreign and 
Commonwealth’ soldiers (FCs) can help to throw light on the complexity of militarized 
citizenship in the contemporary period. In February 1998 the UK Ministry of Defence 
turned again to this postcolonial workforce as a way of augmenting particular sections of 
the armed forces that were under-recruiting. The existing five-year residency period 
required for Commonwealth citizens was lifted in an attempt to meet this shortfall, 
leading to the recruitment of thousands of young men and women from over 30 different 
countries throughout the Commonwealth. Fifteen years later, however, the coalition 
reinstated the residency rule on the grounds that they could not justify recruiting migrants 
at a time when so many individuals were being made redundant. Thus this particular 
migratory path was closed to many young men and women who had previously been 
eligible for this category of work, a significant proportion of whom had been actively 
recruited by British Army teams operating in their countries of origin (Ware 2014).  
Focusing on military migrants in the state armed forces might seem a diversion 
from analyzing the role of migrants in the private security sector, but the example 
provided by the UK illustrates an important point. It is more expedient for governments 
to work with private corporations – such as Capita and G4S1 – than continue to justify the 
use of migrants from outside the EU. However, the effects of populist measures to 
regulate immigration have impacted on migrant soldiers and their families, bringing the 
Ministry of Defence into direct conflict with public opinion. In the next section we 
                                                 
1
 G4S Media Centre News, ‘Armed Forces Reservists: G4S pledges to become 
leading provider of Armed Forces Reservists’. 23 July 2014 
http://www.g4s.com/en/Media%20Centre/News/2014/07/23/Armed%20For
ces%20Reservists/ 
  
explore the ambiguous status of military migrants as they move between the public and 
private sectors, highlighting the changing conditions of military labour in the 21
st
 century.  
 
The Ambiguous Status of Military Migrants  
The connotations of being a ‘mercenary’ is relevant to this discussion of those who work 
in and across the private and state security spheres, not least because of its emotive force. 
Within the context of national military service in which employment is still rooted in 
notions of loyalty, citizenship and patriotism, the word ‘mercenary’ implies a lack of 
fidelity to such ideals and a readiness to perform dangerous and potentially lethal work 
solely for financial reward. A Fijian officer in the UK armed forces once mentioned to 
me that he had recently witnessed a heated discussion among his compatriots who were 
asking: ‘What are we doing in the British Army? Are we mercenaries?’ In a way this 
question can be interpreted as a rhetorical one, since they would have known that the 
constitution of the Commonwealth permits the UK government a special dispensation to 
recruit non-UK nationals. In addition, the oath of attestation requires individuals to 
pledge allegiance to the Queen who is nominally the monarch of 15 Commonwealth 
realms, including Fiji. In my research I heard soldiers from Fiji routinely talk about 
“coming up to the UK to serve Her Majesty”, implying that they were partly motivated 
by patriotism in their decision to leave their country. 
However, the question about being mercenaries doubtless reflects the degree to 
which Fijian soldiers might feel outsiders within the context of UK society. Their 
experience of serving in a national army, not just as ethnic and cultural minorities but 
also as migrants who are subject to increasingly draconian immigration regulations, can 
  
be used to expose the contradictions entailed in performing a role normally associated 
with what Catherine Lutz has called ‘supercitizenship’ within the corresponding US 
context (Lutz 2002, 794). 
One of the outcomes of unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the UK, 
particularly the high rate of fatalities and serious injuries among soldiers, has been a 
renewed emphasis on the soldier who is viewed as both a victim of disastrous foreign 
policy and a figure deserving of public support (McCartney 2010; Ware 2014). In fact the 
word ‘soldier’ has become interchangeable with the word ‘hero’, a label that makes the 
reality of migrant status all the more galling for those servicemen and women who are 
not UK citizens. Not surprisingly this discrepancy has often been highlighted in 
campaigns to stop the deportation of individuals who have served in the UK forces, often 
for more than a decade, and who are subsequently denied residency rights on the basis of 
minor infractions. In one such case, a former soldier, Isimeli Baleiwai returned his 
medals in disgust at the treatment he had received. In a letter to the Prince of Wales 
published in the national media, he wrote: ‘My service to Queen and Country has been 
dishonoured and I have been betrayed’ (Vuibau 2013). 
Although Baleiwai’s case received substantial publicity, there has been relatively 
little public discussion of the employment of migrants in the UK armed forces. Yet aside 
from the fact that their presence solved major recruiting shortages in the army, their 
status as minority ethnic personnel also contributed to the institution’s public image as a 
modern, multicultural employer. When recruiting began in 1998, for example, the 
proportion of black and minority ethnic soldiers in the army barely reached one per cent 
(Ware 2012: 34). According to the 2014 ‘diversity dashboard’, a set of figures published 
  
annually by the Ministry of Defence, this figure has reached over 11 percent. What the 
statistics did not reveal, however, was that migrant soldiers (who now include former 
Gurkhas who have transferred into the regular armed forces), outnumber UK-born 
minority ethnic soldiers by two to one. Nevertheless the social and political significance 
of these figures testifies to the symbolic role of the national military institution as a 
public body that is representative of society as a whole, even (or especially) in its 
diversity. This has been particularly instrumental in discussions about the growing 
proportion of Muslims in the armed forces (Ware 2014). These examples indicate that 
there is a lingering value in retaining migrants in the state sector, given the significance 
of their minority status and the politics of race, especially in the context of deployments 
in Muslim-majority countries.  
Restating the function of military institutions to fulfill their symbolic public 
responsibilities helps to illustrate some of the contingencies of martial labour and the 
restructuring of the global security industry that has taken place over the last two 
decades. Examples of individual vulnerability illustrates the precarious and risky nature 
of labour undertaken by military migrants, certainly in terms of legal status and 
immigration controls. They also reveal the tensions between the public perception of 
soldiering as a profession that is expected to confer the rights to residency, if not full 
citizenship, and the populist politics of immigration control. This point was driven home 
in the emotive campaign for the rights of ex-Gurkhas to reside in the UK which caught 
the national headlines in 2008-9.  
 
‘Colonial constructs of difference’  
  
In his book on military orientalism, Patrick Porter writes, “In and through war, people 
formulate what it means to be Western or non-Western…the very idea of the “West” 
replenishes itself through war”(2011:??). The representation of ‘Gurkhas’ as an 
exceptional group of soldiers reveals the durability of colonial constructs of ethnic 
difference derived from the history of racial subjugation. Although Nepalis are by no 
means the only ethnic group to have acquired an association with militaristic aptitude and 
expertise, their example underscores the value of a historical approach. For example, the 
concept of martial races is a crucial factor in understanding why Gurkhas were so valued 
within British military calculations (see Chisholm in this Handbook). 
The Gurkha security guards who were awarded the medals for gallantry provide 
the perfect guide for understanding the way in which some categories of former 
servicemen are able to consolidate their ethnic identity as a positive asset as they transfer 
into a different job market that requires minimal training and preparation for jobs using 
lethal force. The brochure advertising G4S Gurkha Security Services explains that, ‘Our 
workforce consists of enhanced security officers from a variety of backgrounds and 
former British Army Gurkha officers.’ The organization is motivated by ‘The Gurkha 
ethos,’ which is described as follows:  
“Gurkhas have served the British Crown for almost 200 years and fought and died 
alongside their British comrades in nearly every major war. Displaying loyalty, energy, 
discipline and honour, our ex-military management team all maintain their Gurkha ethos, 
and this is instilled within their teams. These attributes result in very low turnover of staff 
and exceptional levels of professionalism, calmness and clarity – even in volatile and 
traumatic situations.” 
  
 The fluency of this advertising copy compresses an extraordinary amount of 
history, particularly in the first sentence. It is inevitably simplistic as well as inaccurate as 
it gives the impression of consistent, unquestioning loyalty to the British Crown. It also 
muddies the distinction between the word ‘Gurkha’ as a coded ethnic and gendered 
identification and a term that simply refers to their professional affiliation.  
 The notion of a ‘Gurkha ethos’, described in the publicity for G4S Gurkha 
Security Services, has been undeniably strengthened by a highly effective media 
discourse that stressed these qualities while also cementing the notion that military 
service demands particular rewards. Different representations of Gurkha heritage serve 
particular purposes both in Nepal and Britain, where their status as military migrants 
drives continuing campaigns for pensions, parity with UK troops and the right to reside in 
the UK with access to health services and social welfare benefits. Writing about 
‘Nepalese Gurkhas and their battle for equal rights’, Ché Singh Kochar-George has 
argued that ‘colonial stereotyping along racial lines’ not only occupies a powerful place 
in the public imagination but also means that ‘colonial constructs of difference’ continue 
to influence decisions made by the courts and government (2010: 44). Within this 
tradition, the frequent repetition of words such as ‘discipline’, ‘loyalty’, and ‘honour’ has 
also been instrumental in allowing former Gurkhas to position themselves – and to be 
branded – as ideal ‘niche’ employees within the PMSC sector as well.  
 However, here it is important to note that, following the tripartite agreement with 
Nepal in 1947, the Gurkha ‘brand’ is not confined to those who worked within the UK 
armed forces, even though their numbers have been drastically reduced (Ware 2011). 
Chisholm’s valuable ethnographic work underlines the ‘overall sense of exceptionalism 
  
as well as hierarchy of subclassifications’ of ‘Gurkha’ as a label (34). She discovered that 
most of the men she interviewed first aspired to join the British Army, then the Gurkha 
Contingent of the Singapore Police Force; only upon failing that would they become an 
Indian Gurkha. However, despite this hierarchy, she found that all of the Gurkhas she 
interviewed ‘claimed to share common traits and could easily be identified from their 
Nepalese civilian or police counterparts who did not share their same discipline and 
loyalty’ (34). This point is worth emphasizing since Nepali nationals comprise a 
significant proportion of military migrants performing unskilled labour on US military 
bases.   
The global PMSC labour market is undoubtedly a zone that is stratified by 
economic and political interests mirroring those of the national states, organizations and 
companies competing for contracts. Nationality is a surprisingly important factor as many 
prefer to buy security services from their co-nationals, “often promoting this fact in their 
self definitions and in the marketing of their services” (Leander 2009, 14). In the same 
way that armed forces routinely prefer to work with “contractors who are either of their 
own nationality or at least who share a common military culture and background, private 
companies and individuals also find it easier to have security provided by people who 
share their security culture” (Leander 2009:14). This fact, compounded by the reputations 
and aspirations of particular ethnicized and racialized groups, provides another 
determining element in the dynamics of military migration.  
 
Migration journeys 
Writing from a different geopolitical perspective, Brigden and Vogt make useful 
  
connections between the life choices of Salvadorean migrating to the US and young US 
citizens who enlist voluntarily in the military, two groups that embody a “neoliberal 
subjectivity produced through processes of violence, capital accumulation and 
militarization” (2014: 2). Arguing that the decision to join the armed forces and the 
decision to leave one’s home may both be conceptualized “within larger systems of social 
and economic uncertainty” (2014: 3) they suggest that: 
As archetypes in their respective societies, both migrants and soldiers embody 
ideals of agency: resourceful men facing violence with bravery, discipline and a sense of 
duty. Migration journeys and wars can both be conceptualized as rites of passage and 
spaces of liminality marked by strong sense of communitas, courage and sacrifice. 
Migrants and soldiers search for respect, guided by notions of upward mobility, service 
and community, albeit in very different ways (2014:6). 
Brigden and Vogt’s anthropological research provides fresh insights into these 
two areas – migration and military recruitment – indicating the value of a multi-
disciplinary perspective. But what of the young men and women who are prepared to 
traverse the globe in pursuit of military work, also guided by “notions of upward 
mobility, service and community”? The example of military-related migration from Fiji 
provides a valuable case study here. In her discussion of militarism in the Pacific region, 
Teresia Teaiwa describes how ‘the cultures of militarism that pervade contemporary Fiji 
life are rapidly changing in the increasing globalization of labour and rapacious 
consumerization of society’ (2005: 204). Her gendered analysis illustrates the complex 
way in which military values and ideals both influence and reflect social, political and 
cultural divisions in ‘the most militarized independent nation in the Pacific’ (202).  
  
Each year, hundreds of young people, mainly men, leave Fiji to work in PMSCs, 
contributing to national economies that have come to rely on their remittances.
2
 In 2007 
the UN Human Rights Council commissioned a survey following concerns that there 
were large numbers of Fijian men working as private contractors in Iraq. Their report 
began by acknowledging that “Fiji has an established tradition of well-trained, disciplined 
and highly skilled military and security personnel, who perform security functions in 
various capacities worldwide” (UNHRC 2008). Recognising the different factors 
propelling young people to seek work in PMSCs, it warned that “unemployment and/or 
underemployment, a migratory population ready to perform security work abroad, and 
largely unmonitored activities of private security companies in Fiji have facilitated such 
recruitment in Fiji for work, including in Iraq” (2008). However, the report warned that 
“in a number of instances, the security-related functions carried out by Fijians abroad 
through private military and security companies (PMSCs) may qualify as mercenary-
related activities” (2008). 
 
Conclusion 
These juridical issues affecting the employment and immigration status of military 
migrants clearly need to be understood within national as well as wider comparative 
contexts. I have expanded the category here to encompass all those who drawn to work in 
military and security professions, regardless of whether they are classified as 
mercenaries, private contractors or conventional soldiers. The value of including non-
                                                 
2
 In 2006 more than 1000 Fijians were working for private corporations in Iraq and 
Kuwait in security, transport and training (Maclellan 2006). The following year, a 
journalist from Bloomberg news agency witnessed what he called a ‘mercenary harvest’ 
in the country (Copetas 2007) 
  
nationals who work in state armed forces in this discussion is that it highlights the 
common dilemmas faced by governments responding to escalating costs of maintaining 
standing armies, falling recruitment numbers and the mounting legal, ethical and political 
implications of placing soldiers in situations of risk. While in many settings military 
service once provided a link between democratic citizenship and social welfare, the turn 
towards recruiting migrants, even those with strong postcolonial connections to ‘the 
mother country’, signals an underlying crisis in the relationship between citizen and state. 
The UK example indicates that collaboration with the private security sector is replacing 
the use of migrant labour as a more politically (and financially) acceptable solution to 
shortfalls in voluntary recruitment. This has significant implications for changing ideals 
of militarized citizenship.  
Focusing on the figure of the military migrant draws attention to the wholesale 
marketization of military and security work as well as the internal hierarchies and 
patterns of marginalization within this market. Meanwhile the discordant representation 
of soldiers as selfless heroes, ready to die for their countries, and of mercenaries as self-
seeking professional warriors, who sell their skills for financial gain, appears ever more 
stark and unconvincing.  
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